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Empirical Specification Requirements for
Two-Constraint Models of Recreation Demand
Abstract
This paper develops the theoretical restrictions implied by the two versions of Roy’s
Identity when any consumption choice is made subject to two binding constraints.  These
restrictions are analogous to the Slutsky-Hicks equations of standard (single-constraint)
consumer choice problems, though derived from a different conceptual basis in the choice
problem.  They provide the structure necessary to correctly specify two-constraint
recreation demand models. We show the implications for specifying multiple-equation
recreation demand models with endogenous values of time.  Another implication is that
many empirical models do not satisfy the required two-constraint conditions when time
has an opportunity cost.  Yet another implication is that properly specified models
“reveal” the endogenous marginal value of time from coefficient estimates.2
Empirical Specification Requirements for
Two-Constraint Models of Recreation Demand
There has been relatively little formal guidance about how to specify recreation demand
models where time is an important constraint, beyond the basic case originally analyzed by
Becker where time can be converted to money according to an exogenous labor supply
function.  The intuition behind the Becker analyis is that all demands should be functions
of “full prices” and “full budgets,” where time valued at the wage rate is included in the
price and budget terms.  One of the contributions of the Bockstael   paper was to et alˆ
point out that not all recreationists have the opportunity to “reveal” their marginal wage
rate through participation in a discretionary labor activity, and that for these individuals
the relevant value of time is endogenous.  However, their paper does not provide any
guidance on how to specify the value of time in such “corner solution” cases where the
individual offers zero discretionary labor supply.
  This paper develops the theoretical restrictions implied by the two versions of
Roy's Identity when any consumption choice is made subject to two binding constraints.
These restrictions are analogous to the Slutsky-Hicks equations of standard (single-
constraint) consumer choice problems, though derived from a different conceptual basis in
the choice problem.
  These results provide the structure necessary to correctly specify two-constraint
recreation demand models. We show the implications for specifying multiple-equation
recreation demand models with endogenous values of time.  Another implication is that
many empirical models using systems of demands, count data models, or random utility
models are misspecified-- they do not satisfy the required two-constraint conditions when
time has an opportunity cost.  Yet another implication is that properly specified models
“reveal” the endogenous marginal value of time from coefficient estimates.3
Two-Constraint Recreation Choice Models
The standard consumer choice problem with two binding constraints provides the
appropriate theoretical foundation for developing the specification requirements for
recreation demand models when time has an opportunity cost.  Let  (x ,...,x ) be x ￿ "8
consumption goods with corresponding non-negative money prices  (p ,...,p ) and p ￿ "8
time prices  (t ,...,t ), and choices are made subject to a money budget constraint t ￿ "8
M  and a time constraint T =  , both of which arestrictly binding. The money and ￿ px tx
time budgets M and T can be thought of as resulting from a labor supply decision by the
individual, which results in discretionary income and time to be allocated to leisure time
activities and goods consumption.
  Note that binding time and money constraints must characterize the model used
whenever researchers argue that time spent in recreation has a “value” or opportunity
cost. If the time constraint is non-binding, the marginal value of time is zero, the standard
consumer choice problem results, and there is no bias to recreation benefit estimates from
ignoring time.  Intuitively, though, time must always be “spent” in some activity, so
binding time constraints are highly plausible.  Nonsatiation and the presence of numeraire
activities with only one price (i.e, a positive money price and zero time price, or vice
versa) are sufficient for both constraints to bind.
  Consider a consumer with utility function u( ), with   a vector of shift x,s s
parameters.  The primal version of the choice problem is solved by the Marshallian
demands x  = x ( , , ,M,T) which are functions of both time and money prices and time 33 pts
and money budgets.  The indirect utility function V( , , ,M,T) for this problem is pts
    V( , , ,M,T)  max u( ) + {M } +  {T } (1) pt x p x t x x s ￿￿ ￿ -.4
where, with both constraints binding, the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers on the time and
money constraints,  /  =V ( )/V ( )  is the money value of time. .- XQ ￿￿ ˜ 1
 
Empirical Implications of the Two Roy’s Identities
The presence of an additional binding (time) constraint implies additional structure on the
consumer choice problem   This structure can be developed by noting that with two ˆ
constraints on choice, there are two versions of Roy’s Identity, relating the price and
budget slopes within each constraint.
  From the envelope theorem applied to (1), t V x , V x , V  =  , :4 > 4 Q 44 ￿￿ ￿￿ -. -
and V  =  , so for all goods in the estimated incomplete demand system one can write X .
    x ( )  -V /V   -V /V ,            for j=1,...,n. (2) 4: Q > X pt , , ,M,T s ￿￿ 44
The two Roy’s Identities in equation (2) are a source of parameter restrictions in the
empirical demand system and prove useful for specification and identification of the
marginal value of leisure time from demand system coefficients.2
Cross-Price Restrictions
Differentiating(2) with respect to p , one obtains two expressions for the Marshallian 3
cross-money price slope  x / p ‘‘ ˜ 43
 x / p [V V V V ]/V [V V V V ]/V . ‘‘￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 43 X > : X : Q: : : Q : XQ
##
43 4 3 43 4 3 t
Noting that V  and V , replacing the partial derivatives V  and V  with X: : Q: : Q X 33 33 ￿￿ .-
their respective shadow values   and   from (1), and using (2), this can be simplified to -.5
   x / p (V x )/ V x / . (3) ‘‘￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ¶ 43 > : 4: : : 4: 43 3 43 3 .. --
Similarly, the expressions for the cross-time price derivative  x t  from (2) are ‘‡ ‘ 34
   x / t (V x )/ V x / . (4) ‘‘￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ¶ 34 > > 3 > : > 3> 34 4 34 4 .. --
  Equations (3) and (4) can be solved for V  ( V  by Young’s Theorem) and :> >: 34 4 3 ￿
equated, yielding a restriction on the cross-time and cross-money prices,
   x /t (/) x /p ( x x /. ( 5 ) ‘‘￿ ￿ ‘‘￿ ￿ ￿￿ ¶ 34 4 3 4 : 3> .- . - - 34
Because of the unobservables, (5) is not directly useful as sources of empirical restrictions
on two-constraint demand models.  However, by comparing with cross-budget effects, it
becomes possible to derive such restrictions.
 
Cross-budget Restrictions
The Marshallian cross-budget effects are also derived by differentiating both versions of
Roy’s Identity in (2) with respect to M and T, yielding
   x/ M ( x ) / x / ( 6 ) ‘ ‘ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¶ 4> 4 Q : 4 Q -. . -- - 44
   x / T ( x )/ x / (7)  ‘ ‘ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¶ ˆ 3> 3 X: 3 X .. . .- - 33
Because  V , when (6) is solved for   and (7) for  , the two expressions .- . - QX Q X Q X ￿￿
can be equated.  When this equality is simplified, the result can be written as
   x / T ( / ) (x /x ) x / M /x ) (x x / . (8) ‘‘ ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘‘￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ¶ 33 4 4 4 4 : 3 > .- . - - 346
Parameter Restrictions On Two-Constraint Demands
When (8) and (5) are compared, the general form of the Marshallian cross-equation
restrictions in the two-constraint problem emerges as
   x/ t x x/ T ( / ) [ x/ p x x/ M ] , ( 9 ) ‘‘ ￿￿ ‘‘￿ ￿ ‘‘￿￿ ‘‘ 3 443 4 334 .-
Equation (9) takes a form comparable to the Slutsky-Hicks equations from standard
consumer theory, and express necessary conditions which follow from utility maximization
subject to two binding constraints.  They are conceptually distinct from, though closely
related to, the two sets of Slutsky-Hicks equations that result from the two expenditure
minimization problems dual to the two-constraint utility maximization problem.  The
advantage of casting the requirements of theory in a form such as (9), though, is that all
quantities x ( ) and x ( ) are Marshallian, not Hicksian, so they represent 34 pt pt , , ,M,T , , ,M,T ss
directly observable levels and slopes of ordinary demand.
  To complete the comparative statics, when cross-money price slopes are compared
to cross-money budget slopes, and cross-time price slopes are compared with cross-time
budget slopes, the cross-equation restrictions are
   x/ p x x/ M x/ p x x/ M ( 1 0 ) ‘‘￿￿ ‘‘￿ ‘‘￿￿ ‘‘ 34 4 3 43 3 4
   x/ t x x/ T x/ t x x/ T . ( 1 1 ) ‘‘ ￿￿ ‘‘￿ ‘‘ ￿￿ ‘‘ 34 4 3 43 3 4
The necessary conditions represented in (10) and (11) further illustrate the empirical
advantages of developing the symmetry requirements of two-constraint choice theory from
Roy’s Identities.  All terms are observable, so these conditions can be directly tested for or
imposed in estimating empirical recreation demand models.7
  Equations (9)-(11) provide the general symmetry structure which empirical two-
constraint consumer models must follow.3
Implications for Models with Endogenous Marginal Values of Leisure Time
Because equations (9)-(11) hold for general marginal value of leisure time functions  / , .-
they describe the structure that must also apply to thesystem of demands
x h  those at corner solutions rather than interior solutions in the labor 3 3 ￿ G(, ,, M , T )  f o r pts
market.  In this case, the marginal value of time ( / ) is an endogenous variable, which in .-
general is a function of all parameters of the problem.  What problems does the
endogeneity of the marginal value of leisure time cause for specification of two-constraint
demand systems?
  Denoting this marginal value of leisure time function as  / , , ,M,T a set .- 3 ￿￿ ¶ ˜ pts
of sufficient conditions for (9)-(11) to hold is for the price and budget slopes to be related
as
    x / t x / p       for all i, j    (12) ‘‘￿ ￿ ‘‘ 34 4 3 3￿¶ pts , , ,M,T
    log(x )/ T log(x )/ M    for all i, j.  (13) ‘‘ ￿ ￿ ‘‘ 34 3￿pts , , ,M,T)
One might anticipate problems with models using full prices [p3 ￿ 3￿￿ pts , , ,M,T) t ]and 3
full budget  , , ,M,T) T], because of the dependence of   on prices and [M ￿ 33 ￿￿ ￿ pts ab
budgets.  In deriving the price and budget slopes in (12) and (13), terms involving changes
in  with those prices and budgets must be accounted for. 3ab ￿
  For the case of endogenous marginal value of leisure time, a demand equation of
the form
xh ( 33 ￿ p t ,...,p t ) g(M T, )    for i 1,...,n. (14) "" 88 ￿ ￿￿¶￿ ￿ ￿￿¶￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿¶￿ ˜ ￿ 33 3 s8
satisfies (12) and (13), which are sufficient conditions for (9)-(11) to hold, despite the
dependence of  .  For this demand system 3￿pts , , ,M,T) on the full set of prices and budgets ,
again assuming symmetric cross-partial price derivatives ( h / p = h / p ), the price ‘‘ ‘‘ 43 33
slopes and budget slopes are
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Homogeneity of degree zero of Marshallian demands in the price and budget arguments of
each constraint imply that the term in parentheses in each of (15)-(18) is identically zero.
The terms h g  are the specific form of the  income budget slope  x M (for i=1,...,n) 3Q ￿‘ 3/‘
for the multiplicative demand given in (14), while the terms ( h / p ) g are the money ‘‘ ￿ 35
price slopes  x p  for all i,k=1,...,n.  The term in parentheses is then ‘‡ ‘ 35
  ( t x / p x / M T )     0 !
5
53 5 3 ￿‘ ‘ ￿‘ ‘ ￿ ￿
by homogeneity.   Thus, for general value of time functions, (15)-(18) simplify to 4














   x / M h g (21) ‘‘￿￿ 44 Q
   x / T h g , (22) ‘‘￿￿￿ 33 Q 39
and these slopes satisfy the two-constraint choice restriction in equation (10).
  Thus the endogeneity of the marginal value of leisure time in the general corner
solution case causes no additional problems beyond those raised in the interior solution
case.  The two-constraint restrictions must hold, and equation (14) is an example of how
these restrictions can be satisfied with Marshallian recreation demand functions.  Equation
(14) further suggests how researchers can incorporate hypotheses about the structure of
the marginal value of leisure time, as it may depend on prices, budgets, and other shifters
s, directly into the demand model and estimate the marginal value of leisure time directly
as part of the model.
A Problem with Common Practice in Modeling Time
It is common in the literature to find recreation demand models that include a time price of
recreation but no corresponding time budget variable.  That is, full price (money cost plus
time cost) and money income are included in the specification.  The point which may not
be fully appreciated is that omission of the time budget variable invalidates the use of full
prices in the model.
  The inconsistency of using full prices and money budget alone can be seen by
recalling equation (11) for the single-equation demand model with exogenous marginal
value of leisure time.  This equation must hold in the empirical model if the researcher
includes a time price (thereby invoking the maintained hypothesis of two constraints on
choice).  The rationale for omitting time budget must be an assumption that  x / T=0, ‘‘ 3
and when this is imposed on (11) the two-constraint restriction is
   x/ t [ x/ p x x/ M ] . ( 2 3 ) ‘‘￿￿ ‘‘￿￿ ‘‘ 33 3 3 3 3 310
If the money income effect on demand is nonzero, then a demand model based on full
prices and budgets, such as (14), would not satisfy (23).  An obvious problem is the
dependence on a consumption quantity (x ), but any term beyond  x / p  on the right side 33 3 ‘‘
invalidates the use of full prices.
  The analysis for random utility and count data models is parallel, based on
equation (2) for random utility models and (9)-(11) for count data models.
  Time budgets play an integral role in the two-constraint recreation demand model,
in maintaining the theoretical justification for the use of full prices.  To avoid estimating
incorrect models based on full prices and full budgets, they must be included in the
empirical specification.
Inferring the Marginal Value of Leisure Time from Utility-Theoretic Demands
A second empirical point is that the marginal value of leisure time can be measured from
the demand coefficients of a properly-specified system.  Perhaps the easiest way to make
this point is  with the “corner solution” version of the the empirical model of Bockstael et
al., which is
  x MT p t q "" # " " # " $
ww ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !# # " # " # # %
where q is an exogenous quality variable and  + ).  Because this system is "" # # w
"# ￿‡ ￿
utility-theoretic, it satisfies the two-constraint choice restriction in (11).  From (22) and
(23), it can be seen that the marginal value of time can be measured directly from the
demand coefficients, as
   ( x / t )/( x / p ) log(x )/ T log(x )/ M 3 ￿ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ￿ ￿‘ ‘ ¶‡￿‘ ‘ ¶ˆ "" " " " "11
For this model,  x / p x / t log(x )/ M /x , and  log(x )/ T ‘‘￿ ˜ ‘‘￿ ˜ ‘ ‘￿ ‘ ‘ "" " " " # " " " "
ww "# "# #
￿ ##" /x , so (34) becomes
   // 3" # " # # # ￿￿ ˆ ww
#" # "
Bockstael   estimated the money price slope to be  .024, with a time price slope ^ et al. #" ￿
of  2.982.  Thus the marginal value of time in this model is a constant,  ^ #3 # ￿￿ (2.982
units x/hour)/(.024 units x/$)  $124/hour.  This contrasts with the estimate of the ￿
authors, who infer an estimate of $60/hour for the marginal value of leisure time by
comparing compensating variation estimates of welfare loss from eliminating the resource,
denominated in dollar and time units.
Conclusions
This paper develops a number of the structural requirements for the specification of
recreation demand models where time is thought to be an important choice constraint.
Coefficient restrictions take a form similar to the Slutsky-Hicks equations from standard
consumer theory of choice subject to a single constraint, but arise from a different facet of
the consumer choice problem when multiple constraints bind.  The Slutsky-Hicks
equations arise from the identity of Hicksian and Marshallian demands when income or
utility is chosen appropriately, where the two-constraint restrictions arise from the
equivalence of the two Roy’s Identities that govern the response of Marshallian demands
to parameter changes.  Thus the two constraint restrictions relate observable Marshallian
demand slopes and the generally-unobservable marginal value of leisure time.  The
restrictions relating cross-money price and money budget effects are fully observable, as
are the restrictions relating cross-time price and time budget effects, so they can be
implemented and tested for easily in practice.  They provide guidance in two important12
areas not addressed by the existing literature:  specification of how time should enter
systems of demand equations, and how to deal with endogenous marginal values of leisure
time.  The two-constraint requirements apply to all types of empirical demand models
where time is a second constraint on choice, whether motivated as systems of continuous
demands, count data models, or random utility models.
  An important finding is that the basic intuition of the simple model where time is
an exogenous function, and the resulting demand is a function of full prices and full
budgets, carries through to models where the value of time is endogenous.  This should
enable researchers to estimate value of leisure time functions auxiliary to the recreation
demand model of interest.  Individuals with exogenous values of time (those at “interior
solutions” in the labor market) represent a special case where the marginal value of time is
a constant or a known exogenous function.
  Use of the structure required by the hypothesis of choice subject to two binding
constraints is also helpful in empirical practice.  We show that the approach used by much
of the current literature on valuing time, to include full price of the activity but only money
income, cannot be consistent with the requirements of consumer theory.  We also show
how the theory can also be used to infer the marginal value of time from properly specified
two-constraint models.  Thus the empirical two-constraint restrictions should be of
considerable use in specifying theoretically-consistent demand systems and in inferring
marginal values of leisure time from their empirical implementation.13
Footnotes
1.  Parameters appearing as subscripts refer to partial derivatives; e.g., VX: 3 ￿
‘‘ ‘ ˆ #
3 V( , ,z,M,T)/ T p Thesubscripts i and j index the consumption goods and pt
their corresponding prices.
2.  To minimize notational clutter, it is noted here that all restrictions developed below
hold for goods i, j = 1,...,n; that is, they are restrictions which must be accounted
for in the estimated incomplete demand system.
3.  The results we develop here have also been derived by Partovi and Caputo, who
examine the implications of the general K-constraint consumer choice problem.
They also prove the negative semidefiniteness and rank conditions for the matrix of
cross-equation restrictions for the general K-constraint problem.
4.  It is well-known that the two-constraint Marshallian demand functions are
homogeneous of degree zero in the parameters of each constraint (Partovi and
Caputo; Smith).  For general two-constraint demands, zero-degree homogeneity
implies  ( , , , M,T)   ( , , ,M,T), and differentiation with respect to   yields x pts xpts )) ) ￿
￿￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ !
5 53 5 3 p x / p x / M M)=0.  For the two-constraint model with full prices
and full budgets [which has, as a special case, equation (24)], scale both money
and time prices and budgets by   (which leaves the ratio of Lagrange multipliers,  , )3
unchanged).  Then homogeneity of degree zero implies  ( , xp + t )3 ) ￿
sx p + t s , M+ T) ( , ,M+ T), which upon differentiation with respect to  )3 ) 3 3 ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿
y i e l d s p x/ p x/ M M ) p x/ t x/ M T ) 0 . ￿￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ ‘ ‘ ￿ ￿ !!
55 53 5 3 53 5 3 3
Since the first term in parentheses must be zero by homogeneity in the money
budget alone, the second term in parentheses must be zero also.14
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